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Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,

404 A.2d 8 (1979).
At age thirty-eight Mrs. Shirley Berman became pregnant with
Sharon, her third child.' Throughout her pregnancy, Mrs. Berman
was under the care and supervision of Doctors Ronald Allan and
Michael V. Attardi, 2 specialists in gynecology and obstetrics. 3 On
November 3, 1974, Sharon Berman was born afflicted with Down's
4
Syndrome.
On September 11, 1975, Paul and Shirley Berman filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, naming
Doctors Allan and Attardi as defendants, alleging two causes of action
for medical malpractice. 5 The first claim was asserted by Mr. Berman on behalf of the infant Sharon, for the physical and emotional
pain and suffering which she would endure throughout her life due to
her affliction. 6 Such suits have come to be known as claims for
"wrongful life." 7 The other claim, based on "wrongfil birth,"8 was
for injuries, suffered by the parents themselves, in the nature of emotional anguish, medical, and other costs which they would be forced
to endure in order to properly raise, educate, and supervise Sharon. 9

I Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 424, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
2 Id. at 423-24, 404 A.2d at 8-10.
3 Id.
4 Id.

Children born with Down's Syndrome, commonly called mongolism, are mentally
retarded, susceptible to infection, and subject to a high frequency of congenital heart disease
and acute leukemia. See A. EMERY, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETICS 60 (3d ed. 1974). For
an excellent treatment of the subject by the judiciary, see In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405
A.2d 851 (Ch. Div. 1979).
5 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 11. The term wrongful life has been used as the general name for
all actions in which recovery is sought for someone's birth. See Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: W1rongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409 (1977). It is used in Berman v.
Allan to describe the assertion of the infant that absent the defendant's negligence she would
never have come into existence. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 404 A.2d 8, 11. Some
courts have, however, confused the term with wrongful birth. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
8 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979). The term wrongful birth, as
used in Berman, denotes the cause of action of the parents of an unwanted child against those
persons whose alleged negligence proximately caused the birth of the child. Id.
9 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
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Based on the fact that the risk of having a child with Down's
Syndrome is significantly greater for women near forty years of age
than for younger women, 10 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
were negligent" in not advising Mrs. Berman of the desirability of
amniocentesis as a method of diagnosing the presence of Down's
Syndrome. 12 In amniocentesis, a sample of amniotic fluid is taken
from the uterus and the fetal cells and fluid are analyzed in order to
13
detect genetic defects in the fetus.
Plaintiffs claimed that, had Mrs. Berman been advised of the
"risks and availability of amniocentesis," 14 she would have submitted
to the procedure. 15 Furthermore, they alleged that, had it been determined that the fetus would be born afflicted with Down's Syn16
drome, she would have aborted it.

On November 4, 1977, the trial court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment 17 and, on December 22, 1977, the
plaintiffs filed an appeal. x8 While the matter was pending before the
appellate division, the Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the
case on its own motion' 9 and, in Berman v. Allan, 2 0 reversed in part
the decision of the trial court. Specifically, the supreme court held
10 For women under 25 vears of age the risk of having a child born with Down's Syndrome
is I in 2000. The risk among some women over 40 years of age is 1 in 60. A. EMERY, supra
note 4, at 61-62.
51
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 424, 430-31, 404 A.2d 8, 10, 13 (1979). In the brief of
Defendants-Respondents, it was asserted that amniocentesis is standard practice only for the
treatment of pregnant women over the age of 40. Therefore, there was no deviation from accepted medical standards because Mrs. Berman was only 38 at the time of her pregnancy. Brief
of Defendants-Respondents at 3, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
In New Jersey, physicians are held to an obligation to exercise that degree of care, knowledge, and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised in similar situations by the average member
of the profession practicing in a particular field. See Walck v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 56
N.J. 533, 267 A.2d 508 (1970).
It should be noted that this would be a jury issue at trial, but this issue was not the
concern of the court in Berman. The Bernan court dealt with whether or not an action could be
maintained assuming the negligence of the defendants.
12 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
13 See id. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10; W. FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, GENETIC COUNSELING
91-94 (2d ed. 1976).
14 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979). The risk involved in submitting
to amniocentesis has been found to be very small. See note 120 infra and accompanying text.
15 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
16 Id.
17 Id. The trial court considered itself bound by Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967). Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979). See note 45 infra and
accompanying text.
18 Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
19 Id.
20 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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that neither Sharon's action for wrongful life, 21 nor her parent's claim
for medical and other costs were cognizable at law. 2 2 The court did,
however, recognize Mr. and Mrs. Berman's claims for emotional and
23
mental anguish as valid grounds for relief.
Actions, such as Sharon Berman's, for wrongful life, have usually
been viewed as an assertion that the plaintiff would be better off not
to have been born. 24 Since the earliest cases in this area, analytical
problems with justifying the award of damages have been a bar to
granting relief. The courts have been unwilling to allow a plaintiff to
25
recover damages based on the circumstances of his or her birth.
The first case in which the term wrongful life was used did not
involve medical malpractice. 26 Zepeda v. Zepeda2 7 involved a son,
born out of wedlock, who sued his father for causing him to bear the
stigma of illegitimacy. 28 He alleged that his father induced his
mother to have sexual relations by falsely promising marriage. 2 9 The
son also claimed that, because of his illegitimacy, he would be deprived of his right to inherit. 30 The appellate court upheld the trial
32
court's dismissal. 3 1 It recognized that a tort had been committed,
but found that it had to uphold the dismissal for fear of suits by plain33
tiffs who did not like the circumstances of their birth.
Three years later, a New York court reached a similar conclusion. In Williams v. State, 34 the plaintiff's mother had been raped
while she was an inmate of a state mental institution. 3 5 The infant
plaintiff sued the State of New York alleging that, if not for the negligence of state employees, her mother would not have been raped and
she would not have been born illegitimate. 36 The Court of Appeals

21
22

Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.

23 Id. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15.

24 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
25 See notes 33 & 38 infra and accompanying text.
26 Zepeda v. Zepeda was the first case to use the term wrongful life. 41 I11.App.2d 240,
259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (I11.App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
27 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
28 Id. at 245-46, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
29

Id.

30 id.

31
32

Id. at 262, 190 N.E.2d at 859.

Id.

3 Id.

34 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
35 Id. at 482, 223 N.E.2d at 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
36 Id.
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of New York held that neither the novelty of the claim 3 7 nor the
problems with measuring damages were a bar to relief. 38 But one's
' 39
circumstances of birth were held not to be a "suable wrong.
A claim for wrongful life, based on medical malpractice, was first
brought in the case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 40 decided by the New
Jersey supreme court in 1967. It was the first case in which plaintiffs
alleged that it would have been better for a child to have been
aborted than to have been born. 4 1 In Gleitman, an expectant
mother, who had contracted rubella, was advised by her physician
that the disease would have no effect on the fetus. 4 2 She subsequently gave birth to a child afflicted with severe handicaps. 43 The
parents and the child sued, alleging that the doctor's failure to advise
the mother of the risk of birth defects prevented the mother from
obtaining an abortion. 4 4 The court refused to recognize either the
child's cause of action or his parents' claims for emotional suffering
and the costs of raising and caring for him. 45 The child's claim for
wrongful life was denied because compensatory damages were not
measurable and public policy did not allow the recognition of life it46
self as an element of damage.
A valid cause of action for wrongful life has not been recognized
by any jurisdiction. 47 Claims for wrongful birth have, however, met
Id. at 483, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
39 Id.
40 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
41 Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. The complaint had three counts. The first count was on behalf
of the infant, Jeffrey Gleitman, for his birth defects. The second count was by the mother,
Sandra Gleitman, for the emotional suffering "caused by her son's condition." The third count
was by the father, Irwin Gleitman, seeking recovery "for the costs incurred in caring for Jeffrey." Id.
42 Id. Sandra Gleitman had consulted the defendants, Robert Cosgrove, Jr. and Jerome
Dolan, physicians specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Cosgrove examined her and
found her to be pregnant. He was advised by her that "she had had an illness diagnosed as
German measles" about one month prior to the examination. "Mrs. Gleitman testified that Dr.
Cosgrove, on receipt of this information and on inquiry by her, told her that the German
measles would have no effect at all on her child." Id.
While with her husband at Fort Gordon, Georgia, Mrs. Gleitman was treated by army
doctors who instructed her to consult her regular doctor about her contact with German
measles. After returning home, she consulted Dr. Dolan. She testified that he had reassured
her that the measles would not affect her unborn child. On November 25, 1959, she gave birth
to Jeffrey, who was afflicted with substantial birth defects. Id. at 24-25, 227 A.2d at 690.
13 Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. The child was born blind and deaf. Id.
" Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
45 Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 694,
46 Id. at 28-29, 227 A.2d at 692.
47 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410-11, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 899-900 (1978).
37
38
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with limited success during the last few years. 4 8 The earliest cases to
deal with claims which have come to be known as wrongful birth
were actions brought by parents against doctors for unsuccessful
sterilization operations.
The Minnesota case of Christensen v. Thornby, 4 9 involved a
father who sued his physician for damages suffered as the result of
the ineffectiveness of a sterilization operation. 50 The complaint,
based on deceit, alleged that the doctor misrepresented the chances
for a successful sterilization. 5 1 Plaintiff sought recovery for the costs
to be incurred in caring for and raising his new child. 5 2 The court
found that the complaint was without merit because the plaintiff
failed to allege fraudulent intent, which was required in an action for
deceit.5" In dicta, the court found that the plaintiff had suffered no
54
damage, but was blessed with another child.
The validity of wrongful birth as a ground for relief was next
considered by a Pennsylvania court in Shaheen v. Knight. 55 In Shaheen, the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract to make him " 'immediately and permanently sterile.' "56 The court held that such a
breach did exist 5 7 but public policy precluded the allowance of damages for the birth of a child. 5 8 The benefits of parenthood were
found to outweigh the detriment suffered by the plaintiff. The
defendant was not forced to pay for the support of the child where
the father wished to retain all of the benefits and joys of parent59
hood.
48

See notes 71-90 infra and accompanying text.

49 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).

50 Id. at 123-24, 255 N.W. at 621. Plaintiffs physician advised him that pregnancy would be
harmful to his wife. He submitted to vasectomy and was informed that the operation was a
complete success. Subsequently his wife became pregnant and the plaintiff allegedly sustained
mental agony and financial expenses. He stied the physician on the theory of deceit. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to sustain defendant's demurrer on the ground that
the plaintiff failed to allege fraudulent intent. Id.
51 Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
52 Id. at 124, 255 N.W. at 621.
53 Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.

54 Id. The court, in Christensen, decided the case on a technicality in the pleadings. Although the decision was considered enlightened because it recognized the propriety of sterilization operations, the court side-stepped the real issue in the case, recovery for wrongfil birth.
-5 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming, 1957).
56 Id. at 44.
57 The court recognized the validity of a contract to perform a sterilization operation. The
court held that "[a] doctor and his patient . . . are at liberty to contract for a particular result."
Id. at 44.
58 Id. at 45. The court found "that to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child
[was] foreign to the universal public sentiment of the people." Id.
59 Id. at 45-46.

1980]

NOTES

957

A strong indication that the reasoning of Christensen and Shaheen was not dispositive on the issue of wrongful birth was found in
Ball v. Aludge. 60 In Ball, the plaintiffs were blessed with the birth
of their fourth child after the father had undergone a vasectomy. 6 1
The plaintiffs sued their physician for malpractice, but at trial the
jury determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish negligence on
the part of the defendant. 62 On appeal the defendant urged that the
reasoning of Christensen and Shaheen was controlling and that the
case should not have been submitted to the jury. 63 The court in Ball
declined the opportunity to make such a ruling and held that the jury
64
had acted reasonably.
A still greater departure from Christensen and Shaheen was
made by the Appellate Court of Illinois in the case of Doerr v. Viilate. 65 In Doerr, the defendant was charged with breach of an oral
contract to make Donald Doerr sterile.6 6 After the operation, Mrs.
Doerr became pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a retarded
and deformed child. 67 More than two years after the birth the plaintiff commenced suit against the physician alleging breach of contract. 68 The defendant claimed that the two year statute of limitations for personal injury suits barred the action. 69 Asserting that
such actions could be based on either tort or contract and that the
plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action based on contract, the court
70
held that the plaintiff's case was not barred by the statute.
The California court of appeal, in Custodio v. Bauer, 71 was the
first court to clearly recognize the right of plaintiffs to recover damages arising from pregnancy subsequent to a sterilization operation. 72 Following ligation of her fallopian tubes by the defendants,
Mrs. Custodio became pregnant. Suit was instituted alleging negligence in performing the operation, misrepresentation, and breach of

60 64 Wash.2d

247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).

61 Id. at 247, 391 P.2d at 202.
62

Id. at 249, 391 P.2d at 203.

r3

Id.

64 Id.
65

at 248-49, 391 P.2d at 203.
at 249-50, 391 P.2d at 203-04.

74 I11. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).

66 Id.

at 334-35, 220 N.E.2d at 768.

Id. at 334, 220 N.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 335, 220 N.E.2d at 768.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 338, 220 N.E.2d at 770.
71 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
72 Id. at 307-09, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 465-67.
67
68
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contract. 73 Finding that the plaintiffs had stated a valid cause of action for both tortious conduct and breach of contract, the court held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to "more than nominal damages."74
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, however, which was decided in the
same year as Custodio, the New Jersey supreme court chose not to
recognize wrongful birth as a valid basis for recovery. 75 The Gleitman decision set a precedent in New Jersey denying an award of
damages for wrongful birth where the parents were deprived of the
opportunity to abort a fetus. 7 6 The court held that the "public policy
supporting the preciousness of human life" precluded the allowance
of damages in such cases. 77

The Gleitman decision can be distin-

guished from prior wrongful birth cases since Gleitman involved the
right to terminate embryonic life rather than mere sterilization. The
reasoning of the Gleitman court on wrongful birth, in cases involving
abortion, was persuasive in jurisdictions where abortions were considered against public policy. In the New York case of Stewart v.
Long Island College Hospital, 78 which had a fact pattern similar to
Gleitman, the abortion issue was also a controlling factor in the
court's decision to deny a cause of action for wvrongful birth. 79

In

73 Id. at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
74 Id. at 325-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. The court stated:
On the present state of the record it cannot be ascertained to what extent
plaintiffs, if they establish a breach of duty by defendants, are entitled to damages.
It is clear that if successful on the issue of liability, they have established a right to
more than nominal damages.
Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Although the above statement appears conservative, a further
reading of the opinion indicates it was meant to be taken in its broadest sense. The court
recommended a case-by-case approach for the formulation of a measure of damages. Id. at 326,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
75 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
76 Id. Cf. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (Law Div. 1975).
77 49 N.J. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693. At the time Gleitman was decided, abortion was illegal
in New Jersey. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693-94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969)
(repealed 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-76 (West 1971) (repealed 1979). The court in Gleitman held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover even if a legal abortion could have been
obtained. The public policy against abortions militated against the award of damages for the
denial of the opportunity to have an abortion. 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693; cf. Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
78 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (memo.), modified on other grounds
meio., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283
N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
79 In Stewart, an expectant mother who had contracted rubella entered the hospital on the
advice of her physician. The doctors at the hospital declined to perform an abortion. She gave
birth to a child with birth defects. 30 N.Y.2d at 695-96, 283 N.E.2d at 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d at
640-41. The appellate division, later affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York, held that
both the child's and the parents' cause of action must be dismissed "particularly ... when
viewed against a backdrop of public policy which at the time declared the proposed abortion to
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cases where the right to abort an embryonic life was not at issue, the

courts have not adopted the Gleitman rationale on wrongful birth. In
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 80 the Superior Court of New Jersey was called
upon to test the applicability of Gleitman to an action for malpractice
for an unsuccessful sterilization attempt. The court cited various authorities, including Custodio,8 to support its position that more than
nominal damages should be recoverable if a breach of duty can be
82
established.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,8 3
holding that the decision to abort a fetus within the first trimester of
pregnancy was not subject to state interference, 8 4 rendered the public policy argument used in Gleitnan to deny causes of action based
upon wrongful birth inapplicable. Jacobs v. Theimer 85 and Becker v.
Schwartz86 are two cases recognizing the right of parents to recover
damages resulting from the missed opportunity to terminate the pregnancy of a defective and unwanted child. In Jacobs, a mother contracted rubella in her first trimester of pregnancy and the child was
born with defects in its major organs. 8 7 The parents brought suit
against the doctor for negligently failing to diagnose the problem and
to provide the necessary information with which they might have
considered terminating the pregnancy. 88 The Jacobs court found the
Gleitman court incorrect in denying the parents a cause of action, 8 9

and held that the parents had demonstrated a cognizable cause of

be an illegal one." 35 A.D.2d at 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 503, affd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d
616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
80 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (Law Div. 1975).
81 Id. at 76, 344 A.2d at 340.
82 Id. at 77, 344 A.2d at 340.
In Betancourt, the court found that the damages suffered by the parents were distinguishable from those claimed in Gleitman. Id. at 74, 344 A.2d at 339. The elements of loss were
separable from the benefit of having another child. The court held that such damages were
measurable. Id. at 75, 344 A.2d at 339. The loss was the financial expense that the parents had
sought to avoid. id.
The court cited West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944),
to show that New Jersey has long recognized the right of plaintiffs to recover damages resulting
from faulty sterilization attempts. 136 N.J. Super. at 75, 344 A.2d at 339.
83 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
84 Id. at 164.
85 519 S.W.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1975).

86 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
87 519 S.W.2d at 847. Mrs. Jacobs alleged that the defendant doctor had assured her that
she had not suffered from the German measles. In fact, she had contracted the disease which
had serious effects upon her child. Id. at 849.
88 1d. at 847-48.

89 Id. at 849.
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action for the "recovery of expenses reasonably necessary for the care
and treatment of their child's physical impairment." 90
In Becker, the plaintiff, age 37, gave birth to a child afflicted
with Down's Syndrome. 9 ' The parents sued their physician for not
informing them of the increased chances of giving birth to such a
92
child and for not advising them of the availability of amniocentesis.
In Park v. Chessin, the companion case to Becker, 93 the parents
sued after giving birth to a child afflicted with polycystic kidney disease, who died two and one-half years after birth. 94 The parents
alleged that they made a conscious choice to conceive the child based
on their physician's advice that the chances for such a defective birth
were "nil." 9 5 The Court of Appeals of New York held that the plaintiffs stated causes of action "for which compensation may be readily
fixed." 96 The recovery was, however, limited to the expenses for the
care and treatment of the child's afflictions. 9 7 The court refused to
grant damages for mental anguish and emotional suffering on the part
of the parents. The holding, in both Becker and Park, confined the
parents' recovery to the pecuniary loss occasioned by the unwanted
birth. 98 This was supported by the argument that the measure of
90 Id.

The court, in Jacobs, found the Gleitman court's objection to awarding damages based

on speculation as to the quality of life understandable. However, the court found that:

The economic burden related solely to the physical defects of the child is a different
matter which is free from the above objection. These expenses lie within the

methods of proof by which the courts are accustomed to determine awards in personal injury cases. No public policy obstacle should be interposed to that recovery.
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the parents of
information by which they could elect to terminate the pregnancy likely to produce
a child with a defective body, a policy which in effect requires that the deficient

embryo be carried to full gestation until the deficient child is born, and which
policy then denies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of treating and caring for the

defects of the child.
Id.
91 46 N.Y.2d at 405-06, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
92 Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
93 Id. at 401, 406, 386 N.E.2d at 807, 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 897.
94 Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. This was their second child to
succumb to this disease. Id.

95 Id. at 406-07, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In 1967, Hettv Park gave birth to
a child afflicted with polycystic kidney disease, who died five hours after birth. Id. Hetty and
her husband, Steven, were concerned about the possible recurrence of this in future offspring.

They consulted their physician before they conceived another child. This physician was "alleged
to have informed [the] plaintiffs that inasmuch as polycystic kidney disease was not hereditary,
the chances of their conceiving a second child afflicted with this disease were 'practically nil.'

Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
96 Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
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emotional damages to the parents would be overly speculative and,
perhaps, a matter better left to the legislature for resolution. 99
The first substantive issue considered by the court in Berman v.
Allan was whether Sharon Berman's claim for wrongful life was a
valid ground for relief. The court's decision, written by Justice
Pashman, ruled "that Sharon ha[d] not suffered any damage cognizable at law by being brought into existence."100 Although the Gleitman decision, regarding wrongful life, was not overruled, the Bermnan
court emphasized that its decision was based upon different reasoning.101 The court criticized the Gleitman decision for placing too
much emphasis on the difficulty of measuring damages. 10 2 Problems
with the measure of damages were found not to be a sufficient basis
for the denial of relief. The court carefully pointed out that Sharon

99 Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902. The Becker court relied on the case
of Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), in denying
recovery for emotional damages.
In Howard, the parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease sued their physician for
failing to inform them of this possibility and of the availability of testing. Id. at 110, 366 N.E.2d
at 64-65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364. The plaintiffs alleged they would have elected to abort the fetus
had tests revealed the presence of the disease. Id. The court held that the parents had no right
of recover' for the emotional trauma suffered by watching their child succumb to the disease.
Id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366. To permit recovery would "inevitably lead
to the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries." Id. at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 365.
The Becker court applied the principles of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 to the issue
of emotional damages. The Restatement supports the argument that if tortious conduct confers a
benefit on the injured party then the benefit must be considered in measuring damages.
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the
interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).

The Becker court found that the love that the parents would experience must be considered in mitigation of the damages; the monetary equivalent of love and affection would be hard
to determine and would make damages too speculative. The court relegated the matter of
awarding emotional damages to the legislature. The court said:
As in the case of plaintiffs' causes of action for damages on behalf of their infants for
wrongful life, the cognizability of their actions for emotional harm is a question best
left for legislative address.
46 N.Y.2d at 415, 385 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
This view was reminiscent of the position taken by the court in Shaheen v. Knight. See
notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
100 80 N.J. at 428-29, 404 A.2d at 12.
101 Id.
102 The court stated:
were the measure of damages our sole concern, it is possible that some judicial
remedy could be fashioned which would redress plaintiff, if only in part, for injuries
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had suffered no damages to be measured. 10 3 Sharon's potential to
experience love, happiness and pleasure, characterized by the court
as the essence of life, was found to outweigh the suffering she would
endure. 10 4 Emphasizing the high esteem with which our society
views human life, the court could not bring itself to hold that Sharon
would have been better off not to have been born.' 0 5
The Berman court chose not to follow Gleitman's holding on the
issue of wrongful birth. The tortious injury sustained by Mr. and
Mrs. Berman, when they were denied the right to make a meaningful
decision to abort Sharon, was held to be compensable.' 0 6 The
monetary equivalent of the emotional distress was found to be an
appropriate measure of the damages incurred by the parents. 10 7 The
Berman majority clearly rejected the argument used in Gleitman that
the benefits of parenthood could not be weighed against the emotional damage caused by the negligence of the defendants. 10 8 The
public policy which precluded the Gleitman court from awarding
damages for the denial of an opportunity to have an abortion was
found to be no longer valid. 10 9 Despite the court's seemingly prosuffered ....
Difficulty in the measure of damages is not, however, our sole or
even primary concern.
Id. (emphasis in original).
103

Id.

Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. In In re Grady, the court considered the request of parents of
a Down's Syndrome daughter to have her submit to a sterilization operation. 170 N.J. Super.
98, 101, 405 A.2d 851, 852 (Ch. Div. 1979). The court gave a detailed description of Down's
Syndrome and discussed the proposition that mentally retarded individuals have the right and
ability to enjoy life to the fullest extent possible. Id. at 104-05, 405 A.2d at 854-55.
105 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. The court in Berman held that to allow damages for life
itself "would [be] to disavow the basic assumption upon which our society is based." Id.
106 Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
107 Id. at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15. The Berman court recognized that claims for emotional
damage in various factual settings have met with great success in recent years. See, e.g., Zahorian v. Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973) (damages awarded for pain
and suffering resulting from being denied the right to rent a listed apartment); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (damages awarded for injuries resulting from fright
without physical contact); Muniz v. United Hospitals Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153
N.J. Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (App. Div. 1977) (parents able to recover for pain and suffering
caused by hospital's mishandling of their child's corpse).
108 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14-15. The court found that to refuse Mr. and Mrs. Berman
redress for their injuries because of problems with the measuring of damages "would constitute
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice." Id.
109 Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13. The court stated:
In light of changes in the law which have occurred in the 12 years since Gleitman was decided, the second ground [(public policy against abortion)] relied upon
by the Gleitman majority [could] no longer stand in the way of judicial recognition
of a cause of action founded upon wrongful birth.
104
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gressive holding on the wrongful birth issue, it held that neither the
medical expenses nor the projected costs of raising Sharon were compensable elements of the parents' injury. 1 1 ° To allow recovery for
those items would be a windfall to the parents, "wholly disproportionate to the culpability of the defendants.""'
Justice Handler's separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took a more expansive view of the issues.' 1 2 Like
the majority, Justice Handler found emotional damage to be the
major compensable injury. He found, however, that Mr. and Mrs.
Berman's injury had more than one dimension." 3 In Justice Handler's view, the parents in Berman suffered an injury when they were
denied the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. The
ultimate decision was irrelevant."14 The other element of the parents' damages, termed diminished parental capacity by Justice
Handler, resulted from the emotional trauma which flowed directly
1 15
from the defendant's negligence.
Justice Handler went on to develop a basis for a claim by the
child. He extended his theory of diminished parental capacity to include a possible action for diminished childhood. 1 6 While Sharon's
claim, under this theory, was causally related to her parents' injury,
Justice Handler did not consider the child's damages to be purely
derivative. 1 7 Rather, he reasoned that Sharon was damaged in her
own right as the proximate result of the malpractice of the defen-

110 Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
M1 Id.
112 Id. at 435-36, 404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part).
113 Id. at 439, 404 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
114 Id. at 435, 404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Handler noted the fact that this case went to the supreme court while it was in a very early
stage of the litigation process. Id. He reasoned that discovery might have revealed an intention
to give birth to the child. He did not view this as detrimental to recovery', writing that: "In
either event a tortious wrong has occurred and this should not affect the plaintiffs' claim for
compensation." Id. It was, in Justice Handler's opinion, "[a] serious, irreversible wrong" when
the parents in Berman were denied the chance "to apply [their] own moral values to the decision of whether or not to bring a handicapped child into the world. Id. at 440, 404 A.2d at 18
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
115 Id. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1 6 Id. at 436, 404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Handler wrote:
[the] plaintiffs should be able to seek to establish that mental and emotional suffering involves moral strife and includes the element of impaired parenthood and,
further, that the child has a legitimate injury claim in the nature of a diminished
childhood.
Id.
s'7Id. at 434-35, 404 A.2d at 15 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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dants. 118 The child's "handicap has been made more burdensome
[because her parents will be] less able to cope with . . . the extra
heavy parental obligations" which caring for her will require. 119 In
this way, Justice Handler was attempting to resolve the analytical
problems which have prevented the success of wrongful life actions.
Under Justice Handler's formulation of Sharon's claim, it is unnecessary to contend that she would have been better off not to have
been born. Sharon's damages would depend on the extent to which
she could prove her parents' dysfunction. In this way, claims for
wrongful birth and wrongful life would be interwoven. The child
would, however, be denied the extensive relief that a successful claim
for wrongful life, in its present form, would bring. In situations where
the parents have proven impairment of their parental function, the
child would be protected to the extent of her parents' disability.
Perhaps Justice Handler's theory of recovery for Sharon Berman
should not be considered a claim for wrongful lifc, but rather a signal
that the court might be more receptive to a more logical basis for
such claims.
The Berman holding acknowledged that advances in genetic forecasting have given rise to a duty of physicians to inform patients of
possible birth defects in their unborn children. 120 The decision to
bring a new life into the world is primarily the prerogative of the
prospective parents. The Berman majority imposed upon physicians a
duty to impart to prospective parents any information essential or useful in reaching that decision. The physician's liability was, however, limited to compensation for the parents' emotional anguish. 12 1 Under
Berman, physicians in New Jersey will not be liable for medical costs
and the projected costs of raising and properly educating children
12 2
who would not have been born but for the doctor's negligence.
This is contrary to the position taken by the courts in Jacobs and
118 Id. He stated that "the infant has come into this world and is here, encumbered by an
injury attributable to the malpractice of the doctors." Id. at 442, 404 A.2d at 19 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119 Id.
120 The court in Berman recognized that liability could arise where a doctor fails to advise

patients of amniocentesis. A study conducted by the National Registry for Amniocentesis published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1976 concluded that the benefits of
amniocentesis far outweighed the risks and that it should be performed as standard procedure
for women over thirty-five years of age. Furthermore,

incidence of fetal loss was not signifi-

cantly increased by amniocentesis. The National Institute of Child Health and Development
National Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group,

Diagnosis, 236 J.A.M.A. 1471, 1473, 1475-76 (1976).
121 80 N.J. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15.
122 id.

lidtrimester Amniocentesis for Prenatal
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Becker. 123 The court has defined the physician's duty while limiting
his liability for failure to adequately fulfill that duty.
The failure to recognize wrongful life as a valid cause of action
results from analytical problems with the issue of damages. The court
was not ready to endorse the proposition that in some instances one
would be better off not to have been born. Until society and the
court adopt that proposition, it will be logically impossible to allow
damages for wrongful life as pleaded in Berman.
Vincent James Rubino, Jr.

123

See, e.g., Jacobs x. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1975); Becker v. Schwartz,

46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).

